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by SCOTT DODSON
For most of the last seventy years,
the Supreme Court has interpreted
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to impose on federal-court litigants a civil pleading regime called
notice pleading. Under this regime,
a civil claim may be dismissed under
Rule 12(b)(6) only if legally insufficient-only if the claim could not be
maintained under any set of facts.
The pleading of facts was necessary
only to provide "fair notice" of the
claim to the defendant.'
Beginning in 2007, the Supreme
Court abruptly changed course by
issuing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
and Ashcroft v. Iqball which impose a
new factual-sufficiency requirement.
Under these cases, a court should disregard all "conclusory" allegations
(whether of law or fact) and assess

the "plausibility" of the claim using
the judge's own 'judicial experience
and common sense." If the judge
determines that the complaint does
not supply sufficient facts to allow
the claim to cross the threshold from
the conceivable to the plausible, then
the claim should be dismissed under
Rule 12(b)(6).
Such a sea change in pleading standards immediately set off alarms in
procedural circles. Serious doctrinal,
normative, and institutional discussions immediately ensued. But many
of those discussions were based, in
part, on empirical speculation of
what real effects the new pleadings
decisions were having on civil claims
in the federal district courts.
Commentators obliged by studying
the cases' effect. However, because

of coding and collection difficulties, those studies have approached
data with two problematic methodological choices. The first is that
studies have tended to code whole
cases rather than claims, leading to
the ambiguous coding category of
"mixed" dismissals and to problems
I am indebted to Joe Cecil, Eric Kades. Sarah
Stafford, and Tom Wilging for reviewing or
commenting on my study and its development.
This Article benefited from comment-, reciived

at presentations at the 2011 SEALS annual conference and at William & Mary Law School. I
also am grateful for the immensely valuable
comments of two anonymous referees Many
thanks to the student research assistants who
helped compile and analyze the data, including
Matt Beard, Andrew Grindrod, Travis Gunn
Antonia Miller, Bill Novick, Chris Sickles, and
Sam Zimmerman.
. Conleyv. Gthson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)_
2. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
3. 556 U.S 662 (2009).

in characterizing the nature of the
dispute. The second is that studies
have failed to distinguish between
legal sufficiency and factual sufficiency. These methodological choices
potentially mask important detail
about the effects of the pleadings
changes.
This paper begins to fill in that
detail. I compiled an original dataset
of district court opinions and coded
each claim-rather than whole
case-subject to an adjudicated Rule
12(b)(6) motion. For each claim, I
also determined whether the court
resolved the motion on grounds

of legal or factual sufficiency. This
methodology opened an unprecedented level of granularity in the
data.
The data reveal statistically significant increases in the dismissal rate
overall and in a number of subsets of
claims. Prior studies based on cases
rather than claims have consistently
found modest increases in the dismissal rate but have differed in their
findings of statistical significance,
My findings, based on claims rather
than cases, suggest that the prior
studies' case-based coding choices
may mask some significance.
I also find an Increase in the
prevalence and effectiveness of
factual-insufficiency arguments for
dismissal. Perhaps surprisingly I
find a decrease in the prevalence and
effectiveness of legal-insufficiency
arguments for dismissal. These data
and insights on the rationales of dismissals are new to the literature and
suggest that TWombly and lqbol are
affecting both the strategy employed
by movants and the rationale for
deciding motions to dismiss,
Overall, I find evidence that
Twombly and lqbal are affecting
pleading-stage dismissals in federal
district courts in a variety of important ways not adequately captured or
reflected by prior studies.
This article proceeds as follows:
First I offer background on pleading
and the previous studies, isolating
some of their deficiencies and demonstrating the need for additional
study. Then Ioutline my methodology
followed by results. Last I analyze

the methodology and results, exploring possible areas for further study.

Civil pleading standards
infederal district court
Rule 8(a)(2), which governs most civil
pleadings in federal court, requires
only "a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief,' The rule was
designed to relax pleading strictures, requiring only a viable legal
claim (legal sufficiency) and enough
description of the circumstances to
notify the defendant of the general
nature of the dispute (notice).'
Rule 12 provides mechanisms for
testing a complaint's sufficiency.
Rule 12(b)(6) addresses legal insufficiency. It allows a party to move
to dismiss a complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.' In the seminal case Conley
. Gibson, the Court stated:
In appraising the sufficiency of
the complaint we follow, of course,
the accepted rule that a complaint
should not be dismissed [under Rule
12(b)(6)] for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts
in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief.

Under this standard, a federal
court could dismiss a civil claim
under Rule 12(b)(6) only if legally
insufficient-only if the claim could
not be maintained under any set of
facts. If the law does not recognize
the claim or prohibits it under the
circumstances alleged, then relief
4. FED . CIV. P 8(a)(21.
5. Charles E. Clark, Simplfied Pleading, 2 F R.D.

456,460-61 (1943).
6. PEo. R.C. P. 12(b)[6).
7.355 U.S. 41,45-46 (1957).
8. Swlerklewlcr v, Sarema NA.. 534 U.S. 506,

514(2002).
9. FED. R. CiV. P.12(e).

cannot be granted even if all of the
plaintiff's allegations are true. For
example, a complaint that asserts
a federal claim for discrimination
on the basis of baldness should be
dismissed as legally insufficient
because the law does not recognize
such a claim and provides no relief
for it, even if every fact the plaintiff
alleges is true.
Conley also imposed a requirement that the complaint provide "fair
notice" of the claim to the defendant.
Any lack of notice was remedied not
by dismissal but by a more definite
statement under Rule 12(e),' which
permits a court to order the plaintiff
to file a more definite statement if the
complaint "is so vague or ambiguous
that the [defendant] cannot reasonably prepare a response."'
Thus, under Conley, and as understood by most commentators, Rule
12(b)(6) was for legal insufficiency
only; factual insufficiency was
tied to a lack of notice and remediable by a more definite statement."0
By contrast, weak or implausible
claims were largely unremediable
at the pleading stage; those quintessentially merits-based defects
were relegated to later stages, such
as summary judgment, which were
designed to test the factual meritoriousness of claims after the opportunity for discovery."
Many lower courts have resisted
the liberality of notice pleading by
applying stricter tests of factual
insufficiency." judges of those
courts feared that Rule 12(b)(6) was
438 (1986); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to
Twombly to lqbal. A Double Play on the Federal
RAles of CIvil Procedure, 60 DuE 1.], 1. 18 wi59

(2010); Emily Sherwin. TheStoryofConley: Preeedent by Accident, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES
295, 316 n.83 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed.
2008); A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding
Pleoding Doctrine, 108 Mic. L, Rv. 1, 20 (2009);

10. See, e.g, Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised:A Comment on Ashcroft
v.Iqbal. 85 NoTE Ds4 L.REV. 849,865 (2010);
Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of "General Rules," 2009 Wis. L. REv. 535.
550-51; Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C.Yeazel,
inventing Tests. Destabilizing Systems. 95 IOWA

Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62

837-38 (2010); Wendy Gerwick

The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice,
76 Tax, L. Rev. 1749 (1998); Marcus, supra note
10; Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered
Common Law: The Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure
in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909.
983-84 (1987).

I.
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821,

Couture, Conley v. Gibson's "No Set of Facts" Test
Neither Cancer Nor Cure, 114 PENN ST. L. REY

Pari' STATm 19, 29 (2010); Richard L. Marcus,
The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal
Rules ofCivil Procedure, 86 CoLwm. L Rev. 433,

J

STAN. L.Rev. 1293, 1321 (2010).
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
12. Christopher M. Pairman, The Myth of

Notice Pleading. 45 ARitz L. REV. 987 (2003);
Christopher M4.Fairman. Heightened Pleading.
81 TEX. L. REV. 551 (2002); Richard L, Marcus.

toothless, and some commentators
have credited that fear. Nevertheless, during much of the last seventy-five years, the Supreme Court
repeatedly endorsed the lax structure described above.Y
In 2007, however, the Court surprised everyone with Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 79ombly.t s There, the
Court held that a complaint alleging a federal antitrust conspiracy,
supported only by allegations of
conscious parallel conduct, failed
Rule 8(a)(2) and should be dismissed
under Rule 12(b)(6). Undeniably, the
claim was legally sufficient: federal
law does prohibit conspiracies to
restrain trade,"' and the plaintiffs
did not allege any facts that would
have precluded liability. And the
complaint seemingly provided ade-

quate notice of the claim and its
grounds." Nevertheless, the Court
dismissed the complaint because
It failed to allege sufficient facts
showing a "plausible" entitlement to
relief." Crucially, TiWombly does not
eliminate the old requirements of
legal sufficiency and notice; rather, it
adds a new dimension of factual sufficiency.
In 2009, the Court confirmed and
expanded Twombly in Ashcroft v
lqbal2se The Court made three significant holdings. First, judges may disregard all "conclusory" allegations
when deciding a motion to dismiss.2
This was a reversal of prior pleading
doctrine, which required courts to
credit all factual allegations unless
wholly incredible and to evaluate all
factual inferences In the light most

13. Geoffrey C. HazArd. jr.. From Whom No
Secrets are Hid, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 1665, 1685
(1998) ("Literal compliance with Conley v. Gibson
could consist simply of giving the names of
the plaintiff and the defendant, and asking for
judgment."); Mark Hermann & James M. Beck.
Opening Statement, PlausibleDenial:Should Congress Overrule Twombly and Iqball, 158 U. PA.
L. Rrv. PENNumeA 141, 143 (2009) ("Taken
literally. the Conley dictum could make it timpossible for a defendant to win a motion ti dismiss,
thus rendering Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12 a nullity."), available at http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/PlausbleDenial.pdf;
Rebecca Love Kourlis etal, ReinvigorotingPleadings, 87 DaNy1U. L, Rev. 245. 252 (2010) ("Confey's 'no set of facts' standard did not appear to
require the recitation of any facts atthe pleading
stage."); William M. Janssen, lqbal "Plausibility"
in Pharmaceuticaland Medical Device Litigation,
71 LA. L. REv. 541, 54849 (2011) (calling Rule 8
"toothless").
14. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.
506 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant C'ty Narcotics Intelligence & CoordinationUnit, 507 U.S. 163
(1993); Schener v. Rhodes 416 U.S. 232 (1974);
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). Some commentators, looking at other cases, see more
ambiguity in the Court's pleading doctrine. See
Edward i. Cooper, Kfig Arthur Confronts 7Wqy
Pleading, 90 OR. L. Rev, 955, 963-64 & n.27
(2012); ScorT DODSON, SLAMMING THE FEDERAL

21. Id
22. See 58 Cu.i4aes ALAN WiaowT & ARTHuR
R. MiLLER, FED- PRAc & PRoc. § 1357 (3d ed.
2004) ("For purposes of the motion to dismiss,
(1) the complaint is construed in the light most
favorable to plaintiff, (2) and its alliegations are
taken as true._. Basically what this means,.
is [the court] will accept the pleader's description of what happened to him or her along with
any conclusions that can reasonably be drawn
therefrom.").
23. Iqbal 556 U.S. at 684-86.
24. Id. at 678.
25. Evambly, 550 U.S. at 562.
26. Four studies consider the effects of
'vembly alone. See Kendall W. Hannon, Note,
Much Ado About Avombly?A Study on the Impact
of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on IZ(b)[6)
Motions 83 NOTRE DAME L. Rev. 1811 (2008)
Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly:
A Proposed Pleading Standard [or Employment
DtscriminationCases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REv. 1011;
Joseph A. Seiner, Pleading Disablity, 51 B.C.
L. REV. 95 (2010); William it.l. Hubbard, The
Problem ofMeasuringLegal Change, with Application to Bell Atlantic v. Twombly (draft of June 14,
2011). 'that limitation is problematic because
it was not until lqlbal that the new pleading
regime was settled as meaningful and transsubstantive. The results of these studies might
be as Indicative of the confusion surround'
Ing the lWambly standard as of the changing
rate of dismissal under the new standard. It
is true that some uncertainty persists after
lqbal, see Alex Reinert, Pleading as InformationForcing, 75 L. &CoNrEMp. PRoss. 1, 2, 16 (2012)
(documenting disparate applications of Iqbal),
but Iqbal resolved many of TiWembl's broader
ambiguities.
27. Patricia W. Itatamyar Moore, An Updated
QuantitativeStudy of Ilqbal's Impact on 12(b)(6)
Motions, 46 U. RiCa. L. Rev. 603 (2011); Patricia
W. Hatamyar. The Too of Pleading: Do Tw'ombly
and lqbal Matter Empirically?,59 AM. U. L. Rev
553 (2010).
28- Hatamyar, supro note 27, at 589-96.
29. d. at 621-22.
30. Moore, supranote 27, at 605.
31. Id. at 605.
32. Id. at 618, 622-23.

COURTHOUSE Doons? New PLEADING IN THE

TWENTY-FIRsT CearutY (Oxford Univ. Press,
forthcoming 2013),
15. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
17. 7veombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (acknowledg-

Ing that the allegations were "consistent with"
liability). But see Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and
the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)[2]: Toward
a Structured Approach to Federal Pleading Prmctice, 243 F.R.D. 604, 620 (2007) (contending that
the plaintiffs peladed themselves out of court).
18. Thvombly 550 U.S. at 565 n.10: Id. at 588 n.0
(Stevens, J.,dissenting).
19. Id. at 556-57.
20. Ashcroft v. ibat, 556 U.S. 662, 677-80
(2009).

favorable to the pleader. 2 Second,
the Court confirmed that Twombly
sets a transsubstantive pleading
standard that requires the pleader to
state-using nonconclusory factual
allegations-a claim that is "plausible."2 3 Third, the Court held that
judges should assess plausibility by
drawing upon "judicial experience
and common sense."' The purpose of
this new pleading standard is, in the
Court's words, to screen out factually
weak or meritless claims before they
impose costs on defendants and the
judicial system."
To determine
whether the
intended effect was occurring, commentators conducted a number of
empirical or quasi-empirical studies
of Twombly and lqbal.u Although
each has its flaws, and although they
span a variety of methodological
approaches, they are relatively consistent in finding a modest increase
in the grant rate of dismissal motions
filed.
For example, Professor Patricia
Hatamyar conducted two post-Iqbal
studies based on Westlaw opinions.27
She coded by case and whole-motion
result (i.e., grant, deny, or mixed).2
In her first study, Hatanyar found a
statistically significant increase in
grant rates, from 46% (pre-Twombly)
to 56% (post-lqbal), and a statistically significant decrease in denial
rates, from 26% to 18%. The bottom
line was that the odds of a motion to
dismiss being granted or granted in
part were 1.5 times greater under
Twombly and Iqbal than under the
pre-Twombly regime, holding all
other variables constant. The strongest predictor of this variation was
pro se status.2 In her second study,
which amplified the post-lqbaldata,"
she found that the rate of motions
granted without leave to amend
increased by a factor of 1.67 under
lqbal, and that the rate of grants with
leave to amend increased by a factor
of 5.9 times (both significant at the
95% confidence interval)." Excluding pro se constitutional civil-rights
cases still showed an increase in dismissal rates, but only to the 93% confidence interval32
Recently, the Federal ludicial
t

J _-

Center published a study using civil
dockets rather than Westlaw databases. Like Hatamyar's studies, the
IC coded by case and whole-motion
result (grant, grant in part, deny).
The FJC excluded all prisoner and
pro se cases.? The FJC included cases
filed under pleading strandards
other than Rule 8(a)(2), namely,
financial-instrument cases. Excluding the financialinstrument cases
+
t
results in an overall
grant-or-grant-inpart rate increase
'

of 5% post-lqbal

N

TW

the legal-sufficiency standard that
Rule 12(b)(6) has always tested.
Rather, TWombly and tqbal impose
a new factual-sufficiency standard.
Inclusion of a relatively constant
subset of legal-insufficiency challenges could overwhelm and mask
the significance of any increase in
dismissals for factual insufficiency.
Thus, distinguishing between the
4m

+

limit the searches only to cases citing
the permissive Conley or the restrictive lWombly, as other studies did.
Instead, I used those terms only in
the disjunctive, to capture cases that
mayhaveusedthem asa proxy forthe
motion-to-dismiss standard instead
of referencing Rule 12 or "failure to
state a claim." In addition, Iincluded
the term 'Conley' in the post-iqbc
search. I thereby
hoped to reduce the
-tin*
o

DMBLYAND IBAL THE SUPREME

risk ofanysample-

skewing effect from
potentially loaded
search
termsb
Finally, I used a
full twelve-month

(from 66% to 71%),
COU RT USHERED IN A SEA CHANGE
which is significant
to the 95% coneach
in
period
IN PLtAlIING 1USNDARDS.
search to avoid any
interval,
fidence
seasonal biases."
though this figure
Each
search
is not regressed.
AA "
A< 1,
w,**~
generated a list of
Breaking down the
cases, and I first
data by type of case
revealed increases in the dismissal bases for the outcomes is a crucial excluded all Supreme Court and
rate across all types, and a substan- omission." Coding decisions by type circuit opinio ns to isolate district
tial increase in civil-rights cases, 4 of sufficiency challenged (factual or courts. Distri ct courts are on the
front line and have the most experialthough the smallish Ns did not gen- legal) could better isolate the effect
ence with mot ons to dismiss. Includerate statistical significance."
of the new pleading standard.
ing appellate decisions may have
This study undertakes to fill
Methodologically, all these studies
have two common features. First, some of these details left out of prior skewed the res ults because generally
only grants of dismissal motions are
the studies' unit of analysis is a studies.
appealable. Fiurther, although diswhole case. Yet a large percentage of
trict courts fol low circuit law as well
cases have multiple claims. Coding a Mathodology
I studied the impact of TWombly and as Supreme Court decisions, Iqbal
multi-claim case's "type" necessarily
was relatively clear on the legal staninvolves either reliance on classifi- Iqbal on dismissal rates in federal
da-d, and so t here is little difference
cation by others (i.e., the plaintiff or
district courts using an original
the clerk) or difficult judgment calls
dataset with an eye toward exploring among the cr cuits on New Pleading.
about the relative importance of one the detail left out of previous studies. To control for any latent differences
In circuit law, I coded for circuit.
claim over others, and prior studies I began with broadly permissive
Using a ra idom-number generahave conceded the messiness of such circuit-specific Westlaw searches
in each of the "FedX-all" databases
tor, Iselected I00 opinions from each
classifications.' Further, because
decisions on motions to dismiss (where aX" is each circuit)." I did not search list, TIhus, I ended up with
100 pre-o
bly and 100 post-Iqbal
operate at the claim level rather than
the case level, coding results by case
33. Joe S. Cecil et aL. Motions to Dismiss fbr
Causes of Action in Federal Complaints (draft)
necessarily requires the ambiguto State a Claim After (qbal 5-6 (Fed. Jud.
(questioning the efficacy of characterizing cases
ous category of "mixed" decisions, Faiure
Ctr 2011).
by traditionalgrouping suppositions).
in which at least one but not all the
34 I. at 13.
37 Kevin M. Clermont, Three Myths About
35. Id. at 14, 19 21. The p values in some
Twombly-lqbaL 45 WAKE FOREST L, REv. 1337,
claims were dismissed. Coding by categories
were very close to conventional sta1367 n.140 (2010).
claim could provide a clearer picture tistical significance levels, kading one com38. Pre45vWambly dismiss! /p (rule-12 12(b)
of how the new pleading standard is mentator to challenge the F)C's conclusions that (6) conley (fail! /3 state /3 claim)) & da(aft
the increases found were not meaningful See
21/5/2006) & da(bef 21/5/2007). Post-Ilqbal:
operating.
Lonny Hoffman. Twombly and lqbar's Measure
dismiss! /p (rule-12 12(b)(6) conley twonbly
The second common methodologi- An Assessment of the Federal Judicial Centers iqbal (fail! /3 state /3 claim)) & da(aft
of Mations to Dismiss, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1,
18/5/2009).
cal feature is that existing studies Study
24-26 (2012).
39. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 10, at 839
fail to distinguish between decisions
36. Cecil supra note 33. at 3 (noting idosynn.66.
cratic
coding
practices
by
clerks);
Hiatamyar,
40. See Moore, supra note 27, at 635 (finding a
based on factual sufficiency and
supra note 27 (noting the difficulties of coding
dental rate of 30%in the first six monthsof 2006
decisions based on legal sufficiency. for 'type" of case); cf. Christina .. Boyd et al., and a 37% denial rate in the last six months of
Neither Twombly nor lqbal disturbs Building a Taxonomy of Litigation. Clusters of 2006).

Category
Circuit

Designations

Published Opinion

Yes,
i

Po Se Claimant

Yes,
ic

1,2,3,4, 5,6,7,8,9,10, 11,DC,fed

Outcome

) smissed, Wt Diomissed
i

AR

district-court opinions from each
circuit.
I then read each case and excluded
opinions that did not resolve a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
under the Rule 8(a)(2) standard. This
was an important step because many
cases that cited to Conley or Twombly
or lqbal or that used 12(b)(6) terminology actually did not resolve a
motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim. The intentional breadth of
my search terms assured a relatively
high number of false hits, making the
reading stage important for catching
and excluding them.
In this reading stage, I discarded
opinions resolving only motions for
summary judgment (which pertains
to a review of the evidence rather
than of the pleadings), Rule 12(c)
motions, jurisdictional dismissals
under Rule 12(b){ 1) or (b)(2), venue
dismissals, and motions to dismiss
only on heightened pleading grounds
such as Rule 9(b) or the PSLRA. The
reason I disregarded each of these is
because they potentiallywere subject
to a different dismissal or pleading
standard. The standards of Twombly
and Jqbal may apply beyond merits
41. These acronyms stand for decisions based
on the In Forma Pauperis statute, 28 US.C.
§ $915A. or the Prisoner Litigatfon Retforr Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-134, both of which permit sa
sponte dismissal of claims for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
42. See, eg. Stephen J. Choi &G. Mitu Gulati,
Bias in Judicial Dedslans: A Window lat the
Behavior of Judges, 37 ). LEGAL STuD. 87, 94
(2008).

vi

41

pleading under Rule 8(a)(2), but the
courts have not resolved so definitively (and, in fact, many courts have
refused to so apply them). Accordingly, to maintain a pure sample, I
excluded all non-Rule 8(a)(2) claims.
I then turned to coding. I did not
code based on whole case, as other
studies have done: rather, I coded
each Rule 8(a)(2) claim decided on
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
Thus, I was not confined to difficult
characterizations of grouped claims,
such as classifying the type of a
whole case. Nor did Ihave the ambiguous category of "mixed" decisions.
Table 1 describes the coding scheme
used for each claim.
A few notes about my coding. I
used the political-party affiliation of
the judge's appointing president to
code the judge's political atTiliation.
There are some problems with this
proxy, but the proxy seems to be an
acceptable one in most studies using
similar measurements.'
I designated a claim as a published
opinion if it was published or slated
to be published in an official reporter,
as indicated by Westlaw. All others
were coded as unpublished.
Icoded as "no" in the Pro Se Claimant category claimants who litigated
on their own behalf but who identified themselves as attorneys or who
were corporations using in-house
counsel.
I coded for claim based on several
groupings. "Civil Rights" included
§ 1983 and Bivens actions against

public officials and entities, most
prisoner-government litigation, and
habeas corpus petitions. "Employment Discrimination" included Title
VII, ADA, ADEA, and other like claims
against private defendants. "Tort"
included intentional torts, medical
malpractice, negligence, FTCA, and
other common-law and statutory
torts. "Contract" included breach
of contract, breach of implied warranties, indemnification, and other
similar kinds ofcontract or quasi-contract claims. "IP" included statutory
and common-law claims commonly
associated with intellectual property
disputes. "Other" included all other
claims, including antitrust, ERISA,
RICO, and environmental statutes.
I included as "dismissed" claims
that were found insufficiently
pleaded but that were technically
not dismissed in the opinion itself.
These circumstances came up in primarily two types of circumstances:
when a district court found a claim
dismissable but nevertheless permitted the plaintiff an opportunity
to replead, and when a magistrate
judge recommended dismissal but
the district court's adoption of the
recommendation was not attached
to the magistrate's opinion. Although
these opinions did not technically
result in an immediate dismissal,
they functionally represent a judicial
finding that a pleading is insufficient
under Rule 12(b)(6) and therefore
should be coded with dismissals. For
the same reason, I coded magistrate
recommendations that a motion
be denied as "not dismissed," even
though it is possible that the district
judge subsequently disagreed.
I coded rationale as "Fact" if the
court determined that the complaint
was factually sufficient or insufficient, "Law" if the court determined
that the complaint was legally sufficient or insufficient, and "Both" if the
court decided on both bases. The distinction between fact-based and lawbased decisions was generally clear
from the opinions.
My methodology has two potential
weaknesses. The first is that it relies
on Westlaw databases of judicial
opinions, which overrepresent pub-

lished decisions and thus may reflect
selection bias in the judge's decision
to publish a case." I will have more
to say about this potential weakness
in the final section of the paper.
The second weakness is that I
did not code for the presence of an
amended complaint, partly because
of the difficulty of following a particular claim through any amendment
process. The FJC recently concluded
that the presence of an amended
complaint is correlative with grant
rates. 44 I leave it to others to determine how much this potential weakness affects my findings.
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Results

My results show an overall increase
in the dismissal rate (as a function
of motions) of all claims from 73.3%
pre-lWombly to 77.2% post-lqbal.
This 4% increase was significant to
the 99% confidence interval. The
overall dismissal rate in each category increased after Jqbal, in most
cases significantly. Table 2 sets out
the results for all claims using a twotailed test, with significance mea-
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The statistical significance of the "All
claims" differential in Table 2 holds up
using a multivariate probit regression
analysis controlling for all other variables (dummies used for Other Claim,
Democratic Judge, Eleventh Circuit,
Represented, Not PLR.A, and Unpublished; Z=2.96, statistically significant to
the 99% confidence interval). This adds
to the robustness of the two-tailed tests
above, suggesting that the significance
of the differences in overall dismissal
rates of all claims pre-Y1,vombty and postlqbal are not due to changes in the distributions of types of cases, litigants, or
judges.
In addition to coding by claim instead
of by case, a primary innovation of my
study is its coding of the rationale of
the opinion as based on factual or legal
sufficiency. The data reveal that the
rationale for dismissals is more heavily
weighted toward factual insufficiency
after Iqbal. The data show that the
factual-insufficiency dismissal rate,
as a percentage of dismissals, has
increased in all categories of cases,
and significantly so in most. Table 3
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sets out the data, using a two-tailed
test, with significance measured at

for most categories. Table 5 provides data
on these changes using a two-tailed test,

95% by *, and 99% by **.

where significance at 99% is denoted **.

Predictably, the rate of dismissal for
factual insufficiency as a function of all
motions has also increased after Iqbal.
In other words, for any given claim
subject to a motion to dismiss, the likelihood that the claim will be dismissed
for factual insufficiency is higher after
Jqbal. This is true, and statistically significant (using a two-tailed test, where
significance is measured at 95% by

As was the case in Tables 2 and
4, the statistical significance of the
"All claims" differential in Table 5
holds up using a multivariate probit
regression analysis controlling for
all other variables, with Z=-6.25, statistically significant to the 99% confidence interval.
Note that adding the percentages in Tables 4 and 5 produces
totals that exceed the percentages in

* and 99% by **) for all categories of

claims. Table 4 sets out those data.
As was the case in Table 2, the statistical significance of the "All claims"
differential in Table 4 holds up using a
multivariate probit regression analysis
controlling for all other variables, with
Z=5.36, statistically significant to the
99% confidence interval.
Perhaps surprisingly, the rate of dismissal for legal insufficiency as a function of motions has decreasedafter Iqbal
y

43. Stephen B. Burbank. Vanishing D ials and
StmmaryJudgmentIn Federal Civil Cases. Drifting
Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EminpuCAL LEGAL STo. 591. 604 (2004); Kevin M.
Clermont &Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata:
A T(de of Waste and Politics, 156 U. PA. L. Ray.
1553, 1558-60 (2008); see also Brian N. Lizotte,
Publish or Perish. The Electronic Availability of
Summary Judgments by Eight District Coures,
2007 Wis. L, Ray. 107, 130 (showing a selection bias In publcation of summary-judgment
opinions).

44. Cecil, supra note 33. at 15, 29,
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Table 2; that is because a few claims
were resolved on both law and fact
grounds, leading to their inclusion in
both Table 4 and Table 5.

Analysis and implications
In this section, I highlight and discuss

some of the more relevant results of
the study
Pre-Twombly Legal-insufficiency
Dismissals Were Routine
One key result is that, even before
TIombly, motions to dismiss were
successful more than 73% of the
time, and no category revealed a
grant rate lower than 65%. These
results are consistent with other
studies of pre-71vembly grant rates.'
45. Civil Case Processingin the FederalDistrict
Courts: A 21st Century Analysis 47-48 (IAALS
2009) (finding more than 7096 of all Rule 12

motions to be granted at least In part).
46.CeciL supranote 33, at 10 n.21.
47, See supra note 12.

These percentages are a function of motions filed, so the data
do not reflect what the overall dismissal rate is of claims filed. Previous studies, however, have tended to
show a motion-filing rate of around
15% pre-Twombly." Based on these
figures, one could roughly estimate that approximately 10% of all
claims filed were dismissed under
Rule 12(b)(6) under the pre-MIvombly
regime.
This dismissal rate undermines
the contention that the pre-Twombly
standard for testing pleadings was
a toothless one. Contrary to that
popular misconception, any number
of relatively common legal deficiencies could justify dismissal. Perhaps
the claim is preempted by federal
law. Perhaps the complaint misconstrues the scope of the law governing the claim. Perhaps the plaintiff
alleges specific facts that, as a matter
of law, preclude the claim.

These are not necessarily rare or
unusual defects, nor are they necessarily the result of poor lawyering.
The scope of the law is often unclear
but important, and therefore highly
contested. Whether the Constitution protects flag burning, what
legal standard applies to gender discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, whether Section 1983
requires exhaustion, whether Title
VII applies extra-territoriallythese are important legal questions that are presented best by a
well-crafted complaint and decided
by a well-prepared judge, often
without needing any further factual
enhancement. A legal-sufficiency
challenge, even before 7wombly,
tees these questions up for judicial
decision. For this reason, it is unsurprising that the data indicate that
the legal-sufficiency requirement
of Rule 12(b)(6) erects a useful and
workable mechanism for resolving-often by way of dismissalquestions of law.
Pre-Twombly Factual-Insufficiency
Dismissals Were Routine
The data show that courts deciding
motions to dismiss under the preTwombly standard often dismissed
for factual insufficiency (more than
1/3 of all pre-Twombly dismissals,
and more than 1/4 of all pre-Tiombly
claims facing a motion) even though
such dismissals generally were not
permitted by existing law. From the
1980s into the early 2000s, several
papers documented the practice by
some lower courts of requiring a
more stringent factual-sufficiency
standard
than
then-prevailing
Supreme Court precedent allowed."'
The results of my study lend empirical support to those observations and
suggest that the practice persisted in
the lower courts even after repeated
and emphatic denunciations by the
Supreme Court.
Twombly and Iqbal Have Changed
Pleading
Some have argued that Twombly
and lqbal did not change pleading,
either doctrinally or in practice,
or that they did not change it very

much." The data undermine this enables those courts to dismiss fac- suppose that these cases would show
argument, though how much is cer- tual-insufficiency claims that they the inverse relationship because
had been uncomfortably squeezing
courts often screen IFP/PLRA comtainly debatable.
plaints without adversarial Input
Table 2 shows essentially single- into a legal-insufficiency rationale) 0
from the defendant" and pro se
digit increases in the dismissal rate In other words, New Pleading may be
(as a function of motions) overall and
legitimizing a practice by some discases with leniency in pleading sufacross all categories. The increases trict judges to dismiss claims that, ficieucy. 3 These factors might lead
while not technically legally insuf- one to surmise that dismissal rates
overall and in a number of categories
are statistically significant. These ficient, struck the judge as so doubt- in these cases ought to he lower
results add conthan other cases.
firmnatary support
iBut
my data reveal
to other studies,
instead that these
which have found
cases exhibit relasingle-digit
but
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TWOMBLYAND AGAIN AFTER. IQBAL.
rate of cases after
were dismissed) and
Iqn These results
strongly significant
increases after lqbal.
also suggest that
-,k 707-0 * -4 AA
studies
finding
These results could
be explained by the
non-significant
increases, such as the FICs study, ful or unlikely that the judge thought
meaningful assistance thatattorneys
just didn't have enough data points justice might be served by dismiss- provide in drafting complaints, or
to generate significance. The data ing them anyway.
perhaps by the absence of meaningappearto support the conclusion that
Whatever the justification, the
ful attorney-selection mechanisms
wombly and lqbal are affecting the
have some implications for iresults
at the filing stages.' 4 Regardless, the
dismissal rate of claims and cases, further study. Ififor example, dismiss
data strongly suggest that any study
at least as a function of motions, in als based on legal insufficiency are of pleading effects that omits such
federal court.
generally without leave to amend but cases is incomplete.
Pleading has changed within dis- dismissals for factual insufficiency
missals as well. Table 3 indicates
are generally with leave to amend,
Westlaw Databases
that factual insufficiency now rivals then it is possble that wiqP, to May Be Probative
legal insuficiency as the dominant the extent it shifts the rationale for Westlaw-based datasets have been
justification for dismissal. I can offer
dismissals in favor of factual insufficriticized as unrepresentative of
dockets generally. Westlaw datathree explanations, all of which may ciency, may ultimately give plaintiffs
in fact be at play here. One is that
more opportunities to amend their bases include all published opinions,
the motion-filing rate has increased, complaints,
plus some-but not all-unpublished
and that that increase is primarily
More study is necessary to bear opinions. It has been hypothesized
or even exclusively attributable to these theories out. The more general
that the unpublished set of opinions
motions relying on factual insuf- story here is that factual-insuffficiency, such that factual-insufficiency dismissals are up and dis481,See, e. Steinmn. supro note 10.
49. See Scott Dodson, PleadingStandardsAfter
ciency dismissals now appear as a missals overall are up. The overall
aell Atlantic Corp. v. Twonbly, 93 VA.l. Rt, IN
higher percentage even the abso- increase Is modest-only a single I
15 142 (2007) (predicting this effect).
50. See Mart Moller, Procedu~re's Ambiguty, 86
digit-but statistically significant.
lute numbers of legal-insufficiency
INs. Les 645667 (2011).
dismissals has remained constant. These data support the anecdotal
5a See Reinert, slpra note 26, at of2 (survey.
Another likely explanation is that commentary that Twombly and Iqbal trig commentary); see also Hasthe Supreme Court
Limited Americans' Access to Courts? Hearing
have changed pleading standards
movants are strategically switchmefsre the l Comm. n theludiciaryT111th icng
Ing legal theories from a perceived
and are having an effect in the lower 9l0s
(prepared statement of Stephen B.
Burbank) (appending alist of post-Tworbly dis
weak legal-insufficiency argument courts."
.
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A third Prisoner, Pauperis,and Pro Se
Litigants Are Affected Most
possible explanation is that some
pre-Womly courts were stretching
sfsenberThe disaggregated data suggest
that prisoner, pauperis, and pro se
the legal-insufficiency standard to
a lgtion,
n
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52. 28 u.s.c.

§ 191A(b)l),

1997e(c)(1)

53e Erickson v. Pvdus 551 U.S. 89,93 (2007).

54. Cf Theodore
& Stewart j.
Schwab, The Realfty of Constitutional Tort Ltf72 CORNELL L. Rr 641, 681 (987
a correlation between representation

has a greater percentage of denials
of motions because such decisions
are generally not appealable and
thus have less need to be reduced to
a published decision.-" If so, then a
dataset that includes only a subset of
unpublished decisions would exclude
a disproportionate number of denials
and thus tend to overstate the grant
rate of motions.A
That theory could be true, but it is
not supported by my data. Because
Westlaw captures some unpublished
opinions, I was able to compare dismissals in unpublished and published
subsets. Table 2 suggests that unpublished opinions reflect higher grant
rates than published opinions, both
before Twombly and after lqbal, and
the probit analysis suggests that any
temporal variation in the publication status did not affect the overall
dismissal rates. My results therefore
lend some support to other studies
that rely on Westlaw databases, and
55. Cecil, supr note 33, at 2.
56. It is worth noting that many commentatars have defended the utility of published-only
datasets despite their potential for underrepresentation. See, e.g., Clermont & Eisenberg,
supra note 42, at 1560; Theodore Eisenberg &
Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and
Empirical issues, 57 VAxn. L. REV. 1529, 1542
n.59 (2004): Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn
Johnson, The Ffects of intent. Do We Know How
Legal Standards Work? 76 CORNELL 1..
Rev. 1151,
1195 (1991).
57 One researcher found nearly identical dismissal-rate Increases among Westlaw-only and
PACER datasets when filtered for represented
parties. See Patricia Hatamyar, Thoughts on the
Federal judiciary Committee's Study of 12(h)(6)
MotionsAfteriqbal, Civit PRocEouRE &FEDERAL
COURTS BLOG (July 11.2011). available at http://
lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2011/07/
thoughts-on-the-federal-judiciary-committeesstudy-of-12b6-motions-after-iqbalhtm).
58. A related selection issue is Westlaw
capture of unpublished decisions. Westlaw cap.
tures some, but not all, unpublished opinions
that are Issued, and the rate of capture varies
widely by district. Cecil, supra note 33, at37 n.47,
It has been reported, however, that Westlaw
includes evcry opinion it can find unless asked
specifically not to. Id. at 27. it does not seem
to me that this selection criterion Is biased
against capturing unpublished denials. Accordingly, absent some evidence of a selection bias
in Westlaw capture of unpublished opinions,
my data strongly suggest that 7tetqbal affects
dismissal rates across the publication divide,
59. Cermont, supro note 37, at 1365.
60. On defendant-selection effects, see Jonah
H.Gelbach, Note, Locking the Doors to Discovery?
Assessig the Effects of Twombly and lqbal on
Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.l. 2270(2012). On
plaintiff-selection effects, see Kevin M.Clermont
& Stewart ). Schwab, Employment Discrimination

they undermine the criticism that
Westlaw-database studies overstate
any 7Wiqbal effect.
These results might have rational explanations. Let's assume that
judges ordinarily do not publish
denials of motions to dismiss because
they often neither are appealable nor
present novel questions of law. Under
the Conley regime, then, one might
expect only a small percentage of
denials to be published. In the wake
of Ewombly and lqbal, however, a far
greater percentage of denials would
be published because Wombly and
lqbol were new, important, and potentially unclear cases, and thus motions
to dismiss were more likely to present
novel questions of law. Relying only
on published cases, then, potentially
overestimates the grant rate under
Conley and reduces the differential in
dismissal rates. Alternatively, if dismissals of prisoner, pauperis, and pro
se cases are disproportionately more
Plaintiffs in Federal Court From Bad to Worse?, 3
FiARV, L. &Pogv REv. 103 (2009); Scott Dodson,
New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 Mica. L. REV.
53, 72-86 (2010): Scott Dodson, Federal Pleading
and State Presuit Discovery. 14 LEwiS & CLARK
L. REv. 43 (2010). For seminal studies of partyselection effects, see Robert G. Bone, Modeling
Frivolous Sutits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 522-29
(1997); George L.Priest & Benjamin Klein, The
Selection of Disputes for Litigation. 13 1. LEGAL
STO. 1 (1984).
61. See Joe S.Cecil et al.. Update on Resolution
of Rule 12(bj{6) Motions Granted with Leave to
Amend (Fed. judicial Ctr. 2011).
62. For an attempt to study this feature, see
Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened
Pleading, 86 INo. L.). 119 (2011); ct. Stephen I.
Choi et al.. The Screening Effect of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 6 ). EMPIRICAL
L.STun. 35 (2009) (studying this feature In the
context of the PSLKA).
63. Bone. supra note 10, at 879 & n.141
(predicting an increase In motions and pleading practice, and arguing that these 'process
costs' should be part of any assessment); Id
at 878 (articulating the social cost of erroneous dismissals); Edward Brunet, The Primacy
of Private Attorney General Cforcement in the
United States. IND. J.ALL. DisP. RasoL. (forthcoming Z012) (positing regulatory-deterrrence
costs of Twflbal); Cecil. supra note 33, at 8-10
(finding a statistically significant increase in
Rule 12(b)(6) motions filed after lal); Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 10 (describing costs
of doctrinal destabilization); Emery G.Lee IlII&
Thomas E. WIllging. Attorney Satisfaction with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 (Fed.
judicial Ctr. 2010) (publishing survey results
revealing plaintiff attorneys to be adding more
facts to complaints as a result of Twombly and
lqbal); Miller, supra note 10, at 67-68 (predictIng that plaintiffs will have to spend more time
and effort investigating clalims and filing more
detailed complaints).

likely to generate unpublished opinions, yet they also are disproportionately more likely to show increased
rates of dismissal after Iqbal, then
studying only published opinions
is likely to understate the effects of
Twiqbal on dismissal rates." In sum,
even if Westlaw databases are not
representative of all decisions, it is
not at all clear that they overrepresent dismissals."

Conclusion
As others have pointed out, the most
accurate empirical tests on the effect
of TWqbal would be very difficult to
develop." Defendant-selection and
plaintiff-selection effects may be far
more meaningful than the dismissal
effect."e In addition, the dismissal
effect may be mitigated by opportunities for amendment."' Also, the
dismissal effect studied here reveals
nothing about the merit of the cases
affected.62 Finally, the dismissal
effect is but one factor in a host of
normatively relevant 7iviqbal effects
yet to be fully studied."
This paper speaks directly to none
of these questions. Instead, it strives
to add knowledge and understanding
to how TWombly and lqbal are affecting dismissal rates. In particular, it
adds granularity at the claim level
and in the rationale for decisions on
motions. The results are not insignificant. The claim-based results add
to the robustness of the case-based
findings of other studies. And the
disaggregation of legal-sufficiency
and factual-sufficiency rationales
opens a new window into the effects
of Twombly and Iqbal. *
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